cv

Basics

Name Verónica C. Pérez
Label PhD Student in Economics
Email vcperez@bu.edu
Url https://veronicacperez.github.io

Work

Volunteer

Education

  • 2023.09 - 2028.05

    Boston, MA, USA

    PhD (Expected 2028)
    Boston University
    Economics
  • 2020.06 - 2022.05

    Bogotá, Colombia

    MA
    Universidad de los Andes
    Economics
    • Advanced Econometrics
    • Advanced Microeconomics General Equilibrium
    • Forecasting in Economics
  • 2016.01 - 2020.05

    Bogotá, Colombia

    BSc
    Universidad de los Andes
    Economics

Skills

Coding
Python
R
STATA
ArcGIS
MATLAB
SQL

Interests

Economics
Development and Growth
Political Economy
Economic History

Publications

  • 2026.11
    Measuring Industrial Policy: A Text-Based Approach.
    Working Paper
    Since the 18th century, policymakers have debated the merits of industrial policy (IP). Yet economists lack basic facts about its use, largely because it is hard to measure. We develop an approach that classifies policies by their stated goals, using supervised machine learning applied to the text of a global database of commercial policies (2010–2022) and show why a systematic approach to measurement matters. We find that industrial policy systematically targets sectors of established comparative advantage — reinforcing existing strengths rather than building new ones, contrary to the infant-industry logic that motivates much of the literature. This finding depends on measuring industrial policy correctly: policies pursuing other goals through the same instruments show no such targeting, and the tariff-based proxy long used in the literature misses the pattern as well. Measuring industrial policy by its goals, rather than the instruments it uses, changes what we conclude about it.
  • 2026
    Localization and Steering of Economic Uncertainty in Large Language Models.
    Working Paper
    Economic uncertainty shapes investment, hiring, and asset prices, making its measurement from text a central task in economics and finance. While LLMs accurately measure uncertainty in financial texts such as earnings call transcripts, it remains unclear whether they develop coherent internal representations or merely pattern-match on surface lexical cues. In this study, we discover that LLMs linearly represent economic uncertainty with a single direction in the residual stream. Using activation patching on two synthetic datasets of contrastive earnings-call statements with varying linguistic styles, we localize this direction and find that models aggregate the uncertainty signal at the final token regardless of lexical patterns. The extracted direction perfectly separates held-out high- and low-uncertainty statements both within- and cross-dataset. Causal interventions show that adding or subtracting this direction monotonically flips uncertainty predictions, including cross-dataset transfer from templated to naturalistic text. Finally, in a downstream portfolio allocation task using real earnings-call excerpts, steering along the uncertainty direction shifts model investment toward safe assets, consistent with economic theory. Together, our results establish that LLMs encode economic uncertainty as a structured, causally active, and transferable representation, offering a foundation for interpretability-based auditing and control of LLMs deployed in financial analysis.
  • 2022.07
    The effect of industrialization on political dynasties: Evidence from Colombian local governments.
    M.A. Thesis
    In this paper I find that industrialization reduces the concentration of political power, measured by the share of elected officials that were part of political dynasties, in the context of 19 Colombian departments. I use newly digitized data from departmental production by industrial sector since 1969 and the international price of manufactures as an exogenous source of variation in the industrialization levels. Using an instrumental variable approach, I find that an increase in one paid manufacturing employee reduces the share of elected individuals from dynasties by 1.15 p.p. Dividing the results by type of office indicates that the impact is more prominent in the election of dynastic individuals in the legislative brand compared to those elected in the executive one. One additional paid employee decreases the average share of dynastic mayors by 0.75 p.p., a 7.8% decrease in the average. On the other hand, an increase in a paid employee decreases the percentage of representatives from dynastic families by 3.24 p.p., which represents a diminution of 13.4%.

Languages

Spanish
Native speaker
English
Fluent

References

Prof. Tarek Hassan
Boston University, Department of Economics — thassan@bu.edu
Prof. Stefania Garetto
Boston University, Department of Economics — garettos@bu.edu
Prof. Réka Juhász
University of British Columbia, Vancouver School of Economics — reka.juhasz@ubc.ca